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Abstract 
 
The paper proposes an empirical method to measure the free riding 
possibility of public deficits in Europe. We use a cross-sectional 
time-series analysis of differences in national public deficits since 
1991, and we compare the evolution of deficits before and after the 
inception of the euro in 1999. Evidence is that the countries breach-
ing  the  Stability  and Growth  Pact  are  not likely free  riders,  but 
rather leaders in terms of deficits. In this case, they may lead the 
march towards higher public deficits in Europe. 
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1.   Introduction 
 
The paper proposes a methodology to test for possible free riding 
behaviours with regard to the European fiscal rule. 
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) was designed to strengthen 
fiscal discipline from the Treaty of Maastricht, fearing that once in 
the  Economic  and  monetary  union  (EMU)  some  countries  may 
hamper the stability of the monetary zone. Seven years later, the 
very countries that pushed for this rule are the ones not abiding by 
it. 
The SGP was first drafted in Madrid in 1995, discussed in Flor-
ence and in Dublin in 1996, and accepted by the Amsterdam Euro-
pean Council of June 17, 1997. 
Meeting in Dublin, the European Council requested the prepara-
tion of a Stability and Growth Pact in accordance with the princi-
ples and procedures of the Treaty of Maastricht. Of the five conver-
gence criteria present in the Treaty, two were specifically aimed at 
fiscal controls, and were kept for the definition of the SGP. Deficits 
are to be kept “within the reference value of 3% of GDP” (European 
Council, 1997), with the medium and long-term objectives being 
“close to balance or in surplus” (European Council, 1997). 
Formally, the SGP is a set of three elements. First, a political 
commitment  of  the  budget  surveillance  process  contained  in  the 
European Council resolution of June 17, 1997 (European Council, 
1997). 
Second is a preventive element contained in the Council regula-
tion 1466/97 (European Council, 1997): the European Council ex-
amines “stability and convergence programmes.” 
Third is a dissuasive element contained in the Council regulation 
1467/97 (European Council, 1997). On the one hand, it refers to the 
excessive deficit procedure (EDP) embedded in article 104 of the 
Treaty of Maastricht: the first two years of excessive deficits were 
to serve as warnings. These sanctions are imposed in the form of 
non-interest bearing deposits. A fixed sum of 0.2% of national GDP 
is combined with an additional 0.1% of GDP for every percentage 
point by which the deficit surpasses the limit. On the other hand, in 
article 2 of the Council regulation 1467/97, it fine points that “in 
addition [to article 104c], the excess over the reference value shall 
be considered temporary if budgetary forecasts as provided by the 
Commission indicate that the deficit will fall below the reference Warin & Wolff: Europe’s Deficit Free Riders  7 
value following the end of the unusual event or the severe economic 
downturn.” 
As the most vocal supporters of the SGP, France and Germany 
could have been expected to be its most faithful servants, as well. 
Both Germany and France have breached the deficit ceiling consis-
tently since 2002. 
  
Figure 1. Public deficits as a percentage of GDP 
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Source: Eurostat, 2004, and own computations (Euro 8 members refers to the 
average deficit of the other eight euro countries) 
 
According to revised budget figures, Greece breached the deficit 
ceiling  since  1999.  Although  breaching  the  deficit  ceiling,  the 
European Council decided in 2004 not to fine the countries. In legal 
words, the Council does not consider this as a breaching of the SGP. 
The stakes are high. The SGP has been justified by the economic 
literature in many ways: one of them being the impediment of free 
riding behaviours that could hamper the stability of the euro zone. 
In light of the recent fiscal developments in Europe, the paper aims 
at testing the free riding assumption. 
The structure of the paper is as follows. In section 2, we present 
a myriad of arguments both supporting the Pact and recommending 8  European Political Economy Review  
   
alternatives. Section 3 presents the model, and section 4 the results. 
The policy implications are drawn in section 5. 
 
 
2.   The rationale for a European fiscal rule 
 
In 2001, Beetsma provides us with a summary of the different ar-
guments in favour of a fiscal rule (Beetsma, 2001). We can refine 
and find at least four arguments in support of the SGP in the eco-
nomic literature. 
 
2.1 Policy-mix 
 
Article 99(3) of the Treaty establishing the European Community 
(European Commission, 2002) stipulates: “In order to ensure closer 
coordination of economic policies and sustained convergence of the 
economic performances of the Member States, the Council shall, on 
the  basis  of  reports  submitted  by  the  Commission,  monitor  eco-
nomic developments in each of the Member States”. Although there 
is a debate on what an appropriate policy mix is, several supporters 
of the SGP argue that with the advent of a central monetary author-
ity, it became important to establish the correct mix of fiscal and 
monetary policy in the Euro-zone (Beetsma, 2001; Issing, 2002). In 
1999, Bolt wraps up this argument: “It is in [the following] context 
that the Pact for Stability and Growth must be regarded: it seeks to 
supplement the common monetary policy framework within EMU 
with sound fiscal policies by the Member States so as to relieve the 
burden on the ECB’s monetary policy and to leave room for the op-
eration of the automatic stabilizers”
1 (Bolt, 1999).  
 
2.2 Credibility of the European Central Bank 
 
Another reason is the maintenance of the credibility of the European 
central bank through insuring its leadership as the monetary author-
ity. As noted by Buti and Van den Noord in 2004, the EMU is, 
“[commonly] seen as a regime of monetary leadership where fiscal 
policy is to support the central bank in its task to keep inflation in 
check,” (Buti and Van den Noord, 2004). This power is drawn from 
                                                 
1   Bolt (1999), p. 1. Warin & Wolff: Europe’s Deficit Free Riders  9 
the following European Council resolution, which accompanies the 
Pact: “it is also necessary to ensure that national budgetary policies 
support stability oriented monetary policies.” When the Maastricht 
Treaty  was  drafted,  many  observers  believed  that  the  European 
budgetary  situation  could  undermine  the  credibility  of  the  future 
European Central Bank (Beetsma and Bovenberg, 1995). If a coun-
try' s fiscal situation becomes unsustainable, other countries might 
be forced to a bail out of the insolvent national government. Alter-
natively, the European Central Bank may be forced to monetize na-
tional debts, and in so doing, may create additional inflation in the 
EU. 
 
2.3 Structural externalities 
 
In order to abide by the fiscal rules of the SGP, countries are forced 
to make needed structural reforms (Warin, 2003). These changes 
occur in the form of attacks on labour and wage rigidities. In other 
words, the fiscal constraints creates endogenous incentives to im-
plement structural reforms. For instance, some authors argue that 
taxation  endogenously  adjusts  fiscal  imbalances  (Amador,  1999; 
Turnovsky, 1992; 1996). 
 
2.4 Free-riding and moral hazard 
 
In 2002, Uhlig focuses his discussion of free-riding and the SGP on 
the effects of centralized monetary policy combined with decentral-
ized fiscal policy (Uhlig, 2002). Uhlig regards the SGP as essential 
in preventing free riding in the form of excessively high deficits in 
some countries. The cause for concern over debt levels hinges on 
the  independence  of  the  central  bank.  Excessive  levels  of  debt 
might lead to a crisis, in which the ECB might be morally, although 
not legally, bound to bail out insolvent countries. The preceding de-
fence of the SGP is not without opponents. A consequent share of 
the literature dissects the relationship between centralized monetary 
and decentralized fiscal policymakers and find that the SGP might 
not be needed under some conditions (Fourçans and Warin, 2000; 
Leith and Wren-Lewis, 2002; Vranceanu and Warin, 2001). 
However,  a  new  literature  occurs  using  the  moral  hazard  or 
“post-contractual opportunism” approach: once a country is within 
the euro-zone, although it was not a free-rider, it may become one 10  European Political Economy Review  
   
(Dixit, 2001; Dixit and Lambertini, 2001), notably if one country al-
ready breaches the SGP (De Haan, Berger and Jansen, 2003). 
 
 
3.   Data and methodology 
 
We compute country pairs between Germany, Italy, France, Spain 
as well as the weighted average of the other eight euro members. 
The reasons why we consider these four countries are twofold. First, 
we  consider  them  as  they  are  the  biggest  in  the  euro-zone.  The 
country pairs will be calculated between the countries themselves, 
and between the countries and the weighted average of the other 
eight euro members. By taking these four countries, and by compar-
ing each of them to the weighted average of the other eight euro 
members, we have a better chance to capture the relevant informa-
tion from the smaller economies. 
Second is because two of them – France and Germany – are cur-
rently breaching the Stability and Growth Pact. By computing these 
pairs, we look at any differences between a country that breaches 
the Pact and Italy, Spain or the weighted average.  
We compare the period before the inception of the euro in 1999 
to the period after 1999. The data start in 1991, after the German 
reunification,  and  end  in  2003.  We  draw  a  cross-sectional  time-
series  analysis,  and  our  pool  is  “temporal  dominant”  (Stimson, 
1985). 
By considering differences rather than levels of public deficits, 
we want to study a country’s behaviour in reaction to another one’s 
behaviour. An analysis of levels would lead to interesting results for 
the next potential breaches of the SGP, but would be less interesting 
in terms of inter-country comparisons. 
The  database  is  constituted  of  data  from  Eurostat  and  the 
AMECO database (European Commission). The model is a closed-
economy model, and we don’t consider open-economy variables. 
In a cross-sectional time-series analysis, error complication can 
be caused by model misspecifications. To deal with this problem, 
we  can  use  either  the  covariance  model  or  the  error  component 
model. After testing for each, we use the error component model: 
dealing with large economies, the reasoning is that the relevant ex-
planatory  variables  that  we  have  omitted  are  random  variables 
across  cross-section  or  over  time.  We  use  the  Parks-Kmenta  ap-Warin & Wolff: Europe’s Deficit Free Riders  11 
proach (Kmenta, 1997; Parks, 1967): time effects are assumed ran-
dom and normally distributed. This model cannot deal with the het-
eroschedastic  error  complication;  however,  the  error  component 
model addresses the contemporaneous correlation of the error by 
including  a  coefficient  of  correlation  between  the  disturbance  of 
two different cross-sectional units at a given point of time (Kmenta, 
1997).  More  specifically,  we  use  a  “feasible  generalized  least 
squares” (FGLS) approach as recommended by Kmenta (1997, p. 
121). Considering these large economies, we also assume that each 
pair has errors that follow a different autoregressive process. 
We analyse the difference in deficits both before and after the in-
ception  of  the  euro.  The  model  is  estimated  using  the  following 
equation: 
 
0 1 2
, 3 4 5
t t t t
t lr t t t
def tburd gdp
debt cpi i
a l a a
a a a e
+ +
+ + +
￿ ￿ D = + + D + D ￿ ￿
￿ ￿
+ D + D + D +
  (1) 
With intercept  0 0 it t a a l = + . Where  0 a  is the “mean intercept”, 
and  t l  represents time effects. Expected signs are given above the 
respective coefficients. We calculate differences for country pairs 
for two groups of variables: monetary and fiscal proxies. We also 
control for GDP, as well as short-run and long-run using the short-
term and long-term interest rates as proxies. 
 
Monetary variable 
 
We control for the percentage change in the consumer price index 
(cpi ). In the Economic and monetary union, and at the stage of the 
current convergence in Europe, a convergence of the inflation rates 
should be accompanied by a smaller difference in deficits across the 
country pairs. This is mainly the result of the institutional design of 
the  EMU.  Indeed,  within  the  SGP  framework,  countries  have  to 
reach a deficit target, while at the same time the European Central 
Bank (ECB) implements the monetary policy for the euro zone. Dif-
ferences in deficits and differences in the percentage change in the 
consumer  price  index  should  be  both  lowered  for  all  pairs.  This 
double institutional constraint on the monetary policy as well as on 
the fiscal policy is assumed to force convergence, and if this institu-12  European Political Economy Review  
   
tional design provides what it was meant for, the intuition is to ex-
pect a positive sign of the cpi  variable. 
 
Fiscal variables 
 
Here, we consider the current tax burden (total economy, denoted 
tburd ), and consolidated gross debt (denoted debt ).
2  
Public deficit excluding interest in percentage of GDP will be 
our dependent variable, denoted def
3. The convergence on one of 
these fiscal variables should lead to a convergence in terms of defi-
cit. The expected value is positive. 
We also control for the gross domestic product at current market 
prices (reference level for excessive deficit procedure). Then, we 
consider the percentage change in GDP ( gdp ), and real long-term 
interest rate ( lt i ) as in the Treaty of Maastricht to capture the long-
term convergence. Here, the convergence of GDPs or interest rates 
should be the outcome of the same business cycle during the con-
vergence period (or at least be a good proxy); hence, deficits should 
converge. The expected value is positive. 
 
 
4.   Results 
 
Interestingly, we find some changes in the explanation of the differ-
ences in public deficits (excluding interest) for our panel after 1999 
(see Table 1). It is first evidence that 1999 is a key date for public 
deficits in Germany, France, Italy, Spain and the euro average. 
 
                                                 
2   The breakdown of total tax burden in capital tax, corporate income tax, and 
labour tax does not provide us with better results. 
3   We consider the actual public deficit excluding interest since we will test the 
long-term interest rates as an independent variable. We also want to capture 
the impact of the change in interest rates on the structure of the budget. By 
looking at the public deficit excluding interest payments, we try to make sure 
that we don’t capture the interest payments. Warin & Wolff: Europe’s Deficit Free Riders  13 
Table 1. Results before and after 1999 [Double-Lin specification] 
Dependent variable: Public deficit excluding interest. Mean: -1.163308, Std. 
Dev.: 2.252526 
 
Variable  Mean  Std. Dev.  Coefficient 
                  
t-statistic 
Before euro (1991-98)         
Interest rate (long-term)  -.6174615  1.88271  -.406061  -2.87** 
Total tax burden  -1.891923  7.181446  .0916524  3.39** 
Public debt  -10.317  37.02883  .0450202  7.74** 
CPI  -.7572308  1.210607  .4701821  1.84 
GDP  -1.634574  2.06873  .2321514  1.97* 
Intercept      .1743485  .78 
n  79       
After euro (>1998)         
Interest rate (long-term)  -.6174615  1.88271  -1.597312  -.53 
Total tax burden  -1.891923  7.181446  .0785506  1.99* 
Public debt  -10.317  37.02883  .0427906  3.04** 
CPI  -.7572308  1.210607  .9540736  2.33* 
GDP  -1.634574  2.06873  .152651  .67 
Intercept      -.3858297  -.98 
n  50       
 
** .01 significance level       
* .05 significance level       
 
A second observation is that the differences in public deficits are 
smaller  across  time:  countries  are  converging  in  terms  of  public 
deficits (see Figure 2). 
A third is the fact that differences in long-term interest rates have 
a negative value: the convergence in terms of interest rates increases 
the inter-country difference in deficits. Initial conditions in Europe 
vary from country to country. Converging in one market means that 
adjustments have to be made in other markets. 
Fourth, CPI becomes significant after the inception of the euro. 
This is relevant as one considers a monetary union with conver-
gence in inflation rates. 
 14  European Political Economy Review  
   
Figure 2. Differences in public deficits from 1991 to 2003 
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Source: own computations 
 
Lastly, we can forecast the trend for the next 15 years. In order to 
do so, we set up the initial conditions for CPI, GDP, tax burden, and 
long-term interest rates as having the same trend as for the period 
1991-2003. The weights considered for each independent variable 
are the ones previously calculated for the whole period 1991-2003, 
conversely to the panel data illustrated in Table 1. We see that the 
convergence in terms of public deficits is reinforced (see Figure 3).
4 
This does not mean that public deficits will decrease, but rather 
that the differences will lessen. In retrospect, Germany and France 
do not seem to be free riders, but rather leaders in terms of public 
deficits. This leads to interesting policy implications. 
                                                 
4    Obviously, as the initial conditions will change in the future, the deficit is 
likely to be different. Nevertheless, the forecast is still useful to see what 
would happen if nothing is done by the policymakers to change the initial 
conditions. Warin & Wolff: Europe’s Deficit Free Riders  15 
Figure 3. Forecast of differences in public deficits (excluding interest) 
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5.   Policy implications and conclusion 
 
One of the reasons why the SGP has been created is the willingness 
to prevent some countries from behaving as fiscal free-riders. The 
SGP has been weakened by its early major supporters, Germany 
and France. However, this study shows that it is less a question of 
free-riding than a broader trend of fiscal relaxation. This can more 
than weaken the fiscal rule, it can lead to the closing stages of the 
already moribund Pact.   
Why is that so? Although included into the definition of the Pact, 
the dissuasive arm seems to malfunction, and this is likely to be one 
of the reasons why countries – Germany and France – decided to 
put more emphasis on their internal matters, then relaxing their fis-
cal policies, instead of strictly abiding by the letter of the SGP (De 
Haan, Berger and Jansen, 2003). 
The main issue of this fiscal trend is that deficits higher than the 
3% ceiling might lead to unsustainable government finances, unless 16  European Political Economy Review  
   
the European real growth rate is higher than 3%. With a real growth 
rate of 1.6% in 2001, 0.9% in 2002, 0.5% in 2003 (European Cen-
tral Bank, 2005), it seems than the EMU needs a tightening of its 
deficits instead of loosening them up. Should it be done by this Pact 
or another one, or just a reform of this one? Europe policy makers 
will  have  to  find  soon  a  “Verständigungsgrundlage”,  an  area  of 
agreement. 
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